An economic analysis of optimal hunting permit prices when the authority faces poaching
2008
Onuma, A., Keio Univ., Tokyo (Japan). Faculty of Economics | Kawata, Y., Keio Univ., Tokyo (Japan). Faculty of Economics
The authority in charge of game management monitors populations of species, determines the number of hunting permit issued, and obtains net benefits from the hunting activities. If poaching exists, the above procedure may not bring the desirable results unless the authority accurately recognizes, the effects of several factors affecting poaching. In this paper, permit price and stock size were regarded as the factors influencing poaching activity. We found that optimal population size, when poaching does not exit, is always higher than that when poaching exists. Therefore, poaching decreases the population size. using the numerical simulation, we demonstrated that appropriate permit price with poaching can be higher or lower than that price without poaching, depending on the parameter values of the permit price function and poaching activity function. Poaching may account from 0% to nearly 90% of the number of hunts: it also depends on the parameter values.
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