أجريس - النظام الدولي للعلوم الزراعية والتكنولوجيا

Lobbying, Counterlobbying, and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Poor and Rich Countries

2004

Cadot, Olivier | Melo, Jaime de | Olarreaga, Marcelo


المعلومات البيبليوغرافية
الناشر
Washington, DC: World Bank
مواضيع أخرى
Wealth; Price elasticity of demand; Beneficiary; Social safety net; Export taxes; General equilibrium; Elasticity of supply; Protectionism; Gdp; Tariff rate; Income levels; Political economy; Labor market; Trade policy; Trade taxes; Production structures; Tariff formation; Tariff escalation; Republic; Expenditures; General equilibrium analysis; Economics research; Equilibrium tariff; New political economy; International trade statistics; Beneficiaries; Political power; Return; Safety net; General equilibrium model; World development indicators; Political system; Tariff rates; Campaign contributions; Protectionist; Tariff protection; Trade reform; Government grants; Price elasticity of supply; Import competition; Political economy of trade policy; Consumer surplus; Derivatives; Price change; Industrial country; Price elasticity; Duty drawbacks; Public funds; Output; Tariff structure; Foreign trade policy; Developing country; Tariff revenue; Constant returns to scale; Tariff negotiations; Production function; Gdp per capita; Capital owners; Market entry; Optimization; Equilibrium value; Incomes; Claimants; Positive tariffs; Developing economies; Domestic prices; World trade; Open economy; Ceteris paribus; Uruguay round; Ldcs; Low-income countries; Derivative; Labor markets; Elasticity of substitution; International economics; Import protection; Domestic price; Tax; Political economy of trade; Utility function
الترخيص
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/17164http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igoWorld BankCC BY 3.0 IGO
النوع
Journal Article; Journal Part

2014-09-15
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