أجريس - النظام الدولي للعلوم الزراعية والتكنولوجيا

Boondoogles and Expropriation : Rent-seeking and Policy Distortion when Property Rights are Insecure

2002

Keefer, Philip | Knack, Stephen


المعلومات البيبليوغرافية
الناشر
World Bank, Washington, DC
مواضيع أخرى
Utility function; Fiscal policy; Private investments; Public good; Government decision; Policy instruments; Secure property rights; Fiscal management; Executive privilege; Rent-seeking; Tax; Legislatures; Empirical analysis; Rents; Discount rate; Veto; Public investments; Government policy; Production function; Decision making authority; Nationalization; Fiscal; Government spending; Growth-reducing policies agents; Government expropriation; Government action; Government officials; Tax policy; Tax revenue; Bureaucracy & corrupt practices; Decision makers; Closed economy; Investment climate; Authority; Tax revenues; Legislature; Institutional variables; Empirical evidence; Elections; Politicians; Economic incentives; Levels of government; Public property; Tax rate; Institutional framework; Public infrastructure; Executive power; Citizens; Institutional arrangements; Voters; Electoral performance; Gdp; Government expenditures; Competitiveness; Public spending; Local governments; Rent-seeking behavior; State-owned enterprises
اللغة
إنجليزي
نوع الملف
application/pdf, text/plain
الترخيص
CC BY 3.0 IGO, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/

2024-10-18
2025-10-25
Dublin Core