An open GNSS spoofing data repository: characterization and impact analysis with FGI-GSRx open-source software-defined receiver

Spoofing is becoming a prevalent threat to the users of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS). It is important to deepen our understanding of spoofing attacks and develop resilient techniques to effectively combat this threat. Detecting and mitigating these attacks requires thorough testing, typically conducted in a laboratory environment through the establishment of a spoofing test-bed. The complexity, cost and resource demands of creating such a test-bed underscore the necessity of utilizing openly available datasets. To address this need, this paper introduces a new GNSS spoofing data repository from Finnish Geospatial Research Institute (FGI) named hereafter as ‘FGI-SpoofRepo’. This data repository consists of raw In-phase and Quadrature (I/Q) data of live recordings of GPS L1 C/A, Galileo E1, GPS L5, and Galileo E5a signals. These datasets encompass three distinct types of spoofing characteristics (synchronous, asynchronous, and meaconing), making them very useful example candidates of open data for testing the performance of any anti-spoofing techniques (be it detection or mitigation). The inclusion of live signals in multiple GNSS frequencies and the presence of cryptographic signatures in Galileo E1 signal make these datasets potential benchmarks for assessing the resilience performance of multi-frequency multi-constellation receivers. The analysis of the datasets is carried out with an open-source MATLAB-based software-defined receiver, FGI-GSRx. An updated version of FGI-GSRx, equipped with the necessary modifications for processing and analyzing the new datasets, is released alongside the datasets. Therefore, the GNSS research community can utilize the open-source FGI-GSRx or any third-party SDR to process the publicly available raw I/Q data for implementation, testing and validation of any new anti-spoofing technique. The results show that time-synchronous spoofing seamlessly takes over positioning solution, while time-asynchronous spoofing acts as noise or in some cases, completely prevent the receiver from providing a positioning solution. Signal re-acquisition during an ongoing spoofing attack (cold start), the receiver tends to lock onto the spoofing signal with the highest peak, posing a potential threat to GNSS receivers without assisted information. Overall, this research aims to advance the understanding of complex spoofing attacks on GNSS signals, providing insight into enhancing resilience in navigation systems.