Bureaucrats, Tournament Competition, and Performance Manipulation | Evidence from Chinese Cities

Publisher

Washington, DC: World Bank

Other Subjects

Summary statistic; Statistical yearbook; Ethnic minorities; Promotion rate; First year; Linear time trend; Institutional environment; Lower costs; Parsimonious model; Take time; Rent seeker; Complementary factor; Institutional context; Aggregate outcome; Promoting growth; Criminal penalty; Local politician; Prior work experience; Political incentive; Government play; High probability; Data manipulation; Local government budget; Empirical result; Amount of power; Government cadre; Quality of bureaucracy; Performance metrics; Local condition; Human settlement; Relative performance; Regional economic performance; Personal network; Career compensation; Recent years; Low density; Local economic growth; Fiscal revenue; Economic region; Information asymmetry; Professional life; Fitted value; General literature; Centralized state; Across province; Descriptive statistic; Open door; Bureaucratic quality; Catering sector; Raw data; Administrative level; Competition framework; Socioeconomic variables; Light intensity; Public choice; Prefecture governments; Bureaucratic performance; Real economic activity; Total output; Political connections; Development research group; State capacity; Linear trend; Job loss; Delivering services; Economic statistic; Private benefit; Sample survey; Political mechanism; Collected data; Satellite data; Air force; Measurement error; Subsequent years; Technological innovation; Socioeconomic conditions; Good performance; City official; Construction enterprise; City leadership; Freight volume; Government behavior; Party discipline; Target setting; Communist party; Party committee; Political cycle; Baseline regression; Several reasons; Geographic proximity; Local economic development; Political competition; Demographic characteristic; Career advancement; Development policy; Marginal return; High population density; Regional distribution; Available data; Industrial value; Econometric model; Administrative hierarchy; Negative value; Regression results; City government; Administrative boundary; Entry date; Statistical agency; Common political; Standard deviation; Local development; Time-varying variable; Performance incentive; Strategic competition; Weighted average; Ratchet effect; Financial interest; Public sector job; Local economy; Robustness check; Career track; Small area; Empirical specification; Negative sign; Coal mine; Other sectors; Solid line; Fixed effect; Administrative ranks; Performance reporting; Real gdp; Limited information; Bureaucratic system; Local government official; Insurance sector; Bureau of statistic; Great power

Language

English

Format

application/pdf, text/plain

License

CC BY 3.0 IGO, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo, World Bank