Introduction of an animal viral disease, especially a notifiable disease, into an importing country or region free from the disease may lead to serious epidemiological consequences and economic losses. Trade in live animals is historically considered one of the most important risk pathways. To estimate the magnitude of such risk, the likelihood of a virus’ entry into a country and the consequences of this event should be jointly evaluated. Depending on data availability, the urgency of the problem and the detail level of the objectives, a risk assessment may be conducted in a qualitative, semi-quantitative or quantitative way. The purpose of this review was firstly to provide a brief description of each step of the risk analysis process, with particular emphasis on the risk assessment component, and subsequently to supply examples of different approaches to the assessment of the risk of the introduction of selected animal viral diseases. Based on the reviewed models, the overall likelihood of introduction of particular diseases was generally estimated as low. The output risk value was strongly dependent on the duration of the silent phase of the epidemic in the country of origin. Other parameters with some bearing upon the risk derived from the epidemiological situation in the country of origin and the biosecurity or mitigation measures implemented in the country of destination. The investigated models are universal tools for conducting assessment of the risk of introduction of various animal diseases to any country. Their application may lead to timely implementation of appropriate measures for the prevention of the spread of a disease to another country or region.

Since 2007, African swine fever (ASF) has posed a serious threat to the European swine industry. In Poland, the numbers of reported outbreaks in pigs and affected areas grow every year. In 2018, the disease was noted in Western Europe, in Belgium specifically, where several hundred infected wild boars have been detected so far. In 2018, the virus unexpectedly emerged in pig holdings in eastern China, northern Mongolia, Vietnam, and Cambodia, causing worldwide concern about its further spread. Since there is still no vaccine available, the only approach to control the disease is biosecurity. Identification of potential sources of the virus is extremely important in light of its phenomenal survivability. The review summarises the current knowledge about ASFV survivability and resistance to environmental conditions, and discusses the role of indirect contact in spreading the disease.

Repeated incursions of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) H5 subtype of Gs/GD lineage pose a serious threat to poultry worldwide. We provide a detailed analysis of the spatio-temporal spread and genetic characteristics of HPAIV Gs/GD H5N8 from the 2019/20 epidemic in Poland. Samples from poultry and free-living birds were tested by real-time RT-PCR. Whole genome sequences from 24 (out of 35) outbreaks were generated and genetic relatedness was established. The clinical status of birds and possible pathways of spread were analysed based on the information provided by veterinary inspections combined with the results of phylogenetic studies. Between 31 December 2019 and 31 March 2020, 35 outbreaks in commercial and backyard poultry holdings and 1 case in a wild bird were confirmed in nine provinces of Poland. Most of the outbreaks were detected in meat turkeys and ducks. All characterised viruses were closely related and belonged to a previously unrecognised genotype of HPAIV H5N8 clade 2.3.4.4b. Wild birds and human activity were identified as the major modes of HPAIV spread. The unprecedentedly late introduction of the HPAI virus urges for re-evaluation of current risk assessments. Continuous vigilance, strengthening biosecurity and intensifying surveillance in wild birds are needed to better manage the risk of HPAI occurrence in the future.

Infectious diseases of swine, particularly zoonoses, have had a significant influence on nutritional safety and availability of pig meat as high-energy protein product since the time that pigs were domesticated back in the 7ᵗʰ century BC. The main sources of swine infectious diseases include the so-called primary sources (direct infection, i.e. through contact with infected and sick animals) and secondary sources (contaminated meat products, slaughter products, and vectors, including ticks). At present, the most serious epidemiological and economic threat to swine breeding in Europe is African swine fever (ASF). This disease, originally coming from Africa, is incurable and causes death of infected pigs and wild boars during 7−10 days after infection. Among the various factors that influence the spread of ASF, important role is played by ticks from the genus Ornithodoros, mainly from the species Ornithodoros moubata. Research on the ASF indicates that other species of ticks can also transmit the virus to healthy pigs in laboratory conditions. Sylvatic and domestic cycles of ASF virus transmission, which have been described so far, require further studies and updating in order to point the potential new vectors in the Caucasus and Eastern Europe affected by the ASF. Effective methods of control and biosecurity may significantly slow down the spread of ASF, which undoubtedly is a major threat to world pig production and international swine trade.

African swine fever virus (ASFV) is a large, double-stranded DNA virus and the sole member of the Asfarviridae family. ASFV infects domestic pigs, wild boars, warthogs, and bush pigs, as well as soft ticks (Ornithodoros erraticus), which likely act as a vector. The major target is swine monocyte-macrophage cells. The virus can cause high fever, haemorrhagic lesions, cyanosis, anorexia, and even fatalities in domestic pigs. Currently, there is no vaccine and effective disease control strategies against its spread are culling infected pigs and maintaining high biosecurity standards. African swine fever (ASF) spread to Europe from Africa in the middle of the 20ᵗʰ century, and later also to South America and the Caribbean. Since then, ASF has spread more widely and thus is still a great challenge for swine breeding. The genome of ASFV ranges in length from about 170 to 193 kbp depending on the isolate and contains between 150 and 167 open reading frames (ORFs). The ASFV genome encodes 150 to 200 proteins, around 50 of them structural. The roles of virus structural proteins in viral infection have been described. These proteins, such as pp220, pp62, p72, p54, p30, and CD2v, serve as the major component of virus particles and have roles in attachment, entry, and replication. All studies on ASFV proteins lay a good foundation upon which to clarify the infection mechanism and develop vaccines and diagnosis methods. In this paper, the roles of ASFV structural proteins in viral infection are reviewed.

Introduction of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) into a country and its further spread may have a devastating impact on the poultry industry and lead to serious economic consequences. Various risk factors may increase the probability of HPAI outbreak occurrence but their relative influence is often difficult to determine. The study evaluates how the densities of selected poultry species and proximity to the areas inhabited by wild birds impacted HPAI outbreak occurrence during the recently reported epidemics in Poland. The analysis was developed using these risk factors in the locations of affected and randomly chosen unaffected commercial farms. Generalised linear and non-linear models, specifically logistic regression, classification tree and random forest, were used to indicate the most relevant risk factors, to quantify their association with HPAI outbreak occurrence, and to develop a map depicting spatial risk distribution. The most important risk factors comprised the densities of turkeys, geese and ducks. The abundance of these species of poultry in an area increased the probability of HPAI occurrence, and their farming intensity in several areas of central, western, eastern and northern Poland put these areas at the highest risk. The results may improve the targeting of active surveillance, strengthen biosecurity in the areas at risk and contribute to early detection of HPAI in outbreak reoccurrences.

African swine fever (ASF), caused by African swine fever virus (ASFV), is currently one of the most important and serious diseases of pigs, mainly due to the enormous sanitary and socio-economic consequences. It leads to serious economic losses, not only because of the near 100% mortality rate, but also through the prohibitions of pork exports it triggers. Currently neither vaccines nor safe and effective chemotherapeutic agents are available against ASFV. The disease is controlled by culling infected pigs and maintaining high biosecurity standards, which principally relies on disinfection. Some countries have approved and/or authorised a list of biocides effective against this virus. This article is focused on the characteristics of chemical substances present in the most popular disinfectants of potential use against ASFV. Despite some of them being approved and tested, it seems necessary to perform tests directly on ASFV to ensure maximum effectiveness of the disinfectants in preventing the spread of ASF in the future.

On-farm biosecurity measures are an important part of a control plan to minimize the introduction and spread of infectious diseases, such as equine influenza, in an equine facility. It can be challenging, however, to evaluate the efficacy of biosecurity measures under field conditions. We used an agent-based computer simulation model to describe the impact of: i) preventive vaccination; ii) reduced horse-to-horse contact; and iii) a combination of vaccination and reduced contact during an outbreak of equine influenza in a simulated horse facility. The model demonstrated that the most effective intervention was a combination of a high proportion of recently vaccinated horses and a substantial reduction in horse-to-horse contact once equine influenza had been identified in the facility. This study highlights the importance of compliance when implementing biosecurity measures, such as facility-level infection control practices, on horse farms.

The objectives of this study were to describe demographics, basic biosecurity practices, ownership structure, and prevalence of porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome (PRRS) in swine sites located in 3 regions in Ontario, and investigate the presence of spatial clustering and clusters of PRRS positive sites in the 3 regions. A total of 370 swine sites were enrolled in Area Regional Control and Elimination projects in Niagara, Watford, and Perth from 2010 to 2013. Demographics, biosecurity, and site ownership data were collected using a standardized questionnaire and site locations were obtained from an industry organization. Status was assigned on the basis of available diagnostic tests and/or assessment by site veterinarians. Spatial dependence was investigated using the D-function, the spatial scan statistic test and the spatial relative risk method. Results showed that the use of strict all-in all-out (AIAO) pig flow and shower before entry are uncommon biosecurity practices in swine sites, but a larger proportion of sites reported having a Danish entry. The prevalence of PRRS in the 3 regions ranged from 17% to 48% and localized high and low risk clusters were detected. Sites enrolled in the PRRS control projects were characterized by membership in multiple and overlapping ownership structures and networks, which complicates the way the results of monitoring and disease management measures are communicated to the target population.

Hepatitis E virus (HEV), norovirus (NoV), and rotavirus (RV) are all hypothesized to infect humans zoonotically via exposure through swine and pork. Our study objectives were to estimate Canadian farm-level prevalence of HEV, NoV [specifically porcine enteric calicivirus (PEC)], and RV in finisher pigs, and to study risk factors for farm level viral detection. Farms were recruited using the Canadian Integrated Program for Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance (CIPARS) and FoodNet Canada on-farm sampling platforms. Six pooled groups of fecal samples were collected from participating farms, and a questionnaire capturing farm management and biosecurity practices was completed. Samples were assayed using validated real-time polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR). We modeled predictors for farm level viral RNA detection using logistic and exact logistic regression. Seventy-two herds were sampled: 51 CIPARS herds (15 sampled twice) and 21 FoodNet Canada herds (one sampled twice). Hepatitis E virus was detected in 30/88 farms [34.1% (95% CI 25.0%, 44.5%)]; PEC in 18 [20.5% (95% CI: 13.4%, 30.0%)], and RV in 6 farms [6.8% (95% CI: 3.2%, 14.1%)]. Farm-level prevalence of viruses varied with province and sampling platform. Requiring shower-in and providing boots for visitors were significant predictors (P < 0.05) in single fixed effect mixed logistic regression analysis for detection of HEV and PEC, respectively. In contrast, all RV positive farms provided boots and coveralls, and 5 of 6 farms required shower-in. We hypothesized that these biosecurity measures delayed the mean age of RV infection, resulting in an association with RV detection in finishers. Obtaining feeder pigs from multiple sources was consistently associated with greater odds of detecting each virus.