In this work, we study a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) where the manufacturer sells the new products via one fair caring retailer in the traditional channel and distributes the remanufactured products through her own direct channel in the presence of the carbon tax regulation. After solving the single-period Stackelberg game model by backward induction and analyzing the impacts of key parameters on the optimal pricing strategies and the performance of channel members, a multi-period dynamic Stackelberg game model with heterogeneous players is further established. The local stability of the Nash equilibrium point and complexity properties of the model are investigated by numerical simulation. The results reveal that (1) the retailer’s fairness concern degree is negatively related to the optimal wholesale price as well as positively related to the optimal retail price of the new product. A high level of consumer discount perception for the remanufactured product is conducive to the manufacturer obtaining more profits while it is detrimental to the retailer. (2) The excessive value of the price adjustment speed, carbon tax rate or retailer’s fairness concern degree has a strong destabilization effect on the system’s stability. (3) The manufacturer suffers profit loss while the retailer’s utility levels are elevated when the system falls into periodic cycles and chaotic motions. (4) The delay feedback control method can eliminate the chaos effectively in the dual-channel CLSC system.

Carbon emission reduction under the Belt and Road Initiative has great significance on China’s goal of carbon peak. To better promote carbon emission reduction, based on the background of the Belt and Road Initiative, this paper analyzes the collaborative carbon emission reduction through investment between Chinese enterprises and local enterprises in developing countries along the Belt and Road Initiative. Considering the efforts of enterprises in carbon reduction, low-carbon infrastructure investment, and promotion of low-carbon products, this paper constructs a differential game model of collaborative carbon reduction cooperation between Chinese enterprises and local enterprises in developing countries along the Belt and Road Initiative. By horizontally comparing Nash non-cooperative mode, Stackelberg master-slave mode, and cooperative mode, the results shows that Chinese enterprises can encourage local enterprises in developing countries along the Belt and Road Initiative to coordinate carbon emission reduction through subsidies, which is Stackelberg master-slave mode. Under the cooperative mode, with the maximum carbon emission reduction efforts of both parties, the total benefit of carbon emission reduction reaches the optimal Pareto equilibrium. In addition, this paper also discusses the influence of related factors on the benefits of carbon emission reduction.

Joint distribution is an advanced logistics organization model for improving the quality and efficiency of express logistics industry and achieves high-quality development of logistics, but the distribution of common profit has always been a key obstacle to the effective development of joint distribution. Based on the background of green and low carbon, this paper explores a fairer and more reasonable profit distribution scheme. The profit game between the government and the two types of member enterprises is analyzed. By focusing on how the government plays a role in inducing the joint distribution alliance to bring the green and low-carbon requirements into the profit distribution, the strategy evolution process of the three parties, the factors affecting the profit distribution and the stability of alliance are discussed through the establishment of “government-member enterprise A-member enterprise B” tripartite evolutionary game model. Finally, the evolutionary game model is numerically simulated based on system dynamics. It is found that (1) it is necessary for the government to guide and motivate the alliance to create internal incentives and constraints. The effect of government subsidies and rewards to member enterprises is greater than the penalties for member enterprises. (2) The member enterprises are likely to conspire together to defraud government subsidies and rewards, carry out “free riding” and other speculative activities, which makes it necessary for the government and the alliance to establish supervision mechanism, information disclosure mechanism, and property rights protection system. (3) The willingness of member enterprise to positively cooperate will increase with the increase of the additional benefit coefficient, the proportion of profit distribution and the importance of environmental benefit factor; and will decrease with the increase of the cost of promoting green distribution operations.

Product competition and pollution control are closely related to watershed environmental management, but existing literature rarely investigates them in an identical framework. Therefore, this paper develops a multiple differential game model to analyze product market competition and ecological compensation games between watershed regions based on the assumption that a region can choose four strategies to regulate its manufacturers while cooperating with other regions in the basin. Then, we solve the model and obtain a simultaneous equilibrium between the governments and manufacturers for the first time. The results show that the combination of emissions tax and ecological compensation results in the highest social welfare and water ecology for all regions in a basin. Furthermore, the ecological compensation rate independent of emissions tax policy and ecological compensation does not shift investment from downstream to upstream, but it can induce the upstream region to increase investment in management. In addition, if the governments impose an emissions tax, manufacturers’ output in both regions decreases, and the upstream region is higher than in the downstream region.

Human societies develop rapidly through the advancement of technology; however, with these advancements, many problems are emerging. The topic chosen for this study surrounds the e-waste, which has become a major problem around the world. Second-hand and unused mobile phones are a big part of globally generated e-waste. If these devices are properly recycled, they can generate substantial economic and resource value. Yet if they are indiscriminately discarded, they cause a profound environmental impact. Given the current low recovery rate of mobile phones, an increase in recovery rates becomes critical in lessening economic and environmental impacts. Based on the status quo of second-hand mobile phone recycling processes in China, this article analyzes the behavior of individuals and recyclers through a comprehensive static information game theory and finds ways to increase the recycling rate of second-hand mobile phones. The study helps the customers, to clearly identify the recycle price. In case of market, the government policy can be introduced with a reward and punishment mechanism. Furthermore, under the ideological guidance of game theory, this paper also establishes a corresponding price model of second-hand mobile phone recycling based on best response dynamics like search, variable neighborhood search, and hybrid meta-heuristic method. This model shows that the recovery time differences have a significant impact on the recovery price. Moreover, to an extent, this model can promote the possibility and initiative of customers choosing cell phone recycling.

As major polluters, enterprises are expected to behave responsibly toward the natural environment. However, enterprises often do not pay enough attention to the environment and may even be environmentally irresponsible. Encouraging enterprises to actively accept environmental responsibility is the key to solving the problem of environmental pollution. This paper uses a differential game model to study the impact of different governmental incentive mechanisms on corporate environmental responsibility (CER). The results of the study show that independent, noncooperative decision-making by the government and the enterprise is not desirable. If the government provides a monetary incentive to the enterprise or sets a corporate pollution threshold to stimulate enterprises’ acceptance of environmental responsibility, environmental quality can be improved. These results lead to useful policy recommendations and a scientific basis for environmental governance, which is expected to be helpful for finding ways to balance economic development and environmental protection in developing countries more generally.

Transboundary pollution control usually requires the cooperation of neighboring countries due to the externality of pollution. However, countries at different levels of development, which are called asymmetric countries in this paper, may have different attitudes toward this cooperation. The developing countries would like to take a free ride and they can benefit from the cooperation with developed countries, but the developed countries may not be willing to afford this cooperation cost. This paper discusses the cooperation between two asymmetric countries that developed country may provide assistant investments to help the developing country reduce pollution stock. We consider a dynamic differential game to model the transboundary pollution control between two asymmetric regions and derive the optimal equilibrium of both regions using the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equation. To explore the impact of assistant investments, numerical illustrations and sensitivity analysis are implemented to compare the equilibrium strategies under two scenarios: that with or without assistant investments. We conclude that the common pollution stock will be reduced when the developed country is willing to provide assistant investments to the developing country. Besides, the equilibrium emission strategies of both countries increase with assistant investments, which means more economic benefits for both sides.

Both carbon and emission taxes popularly exist all over the world. Therefore, it is important to compare carbon with emission tax. Under monopolization, this article establishes game theory model to compare carbon with emission tax. On one hand, both carbon and emission taxes reduce energy inputs, outputs, profits, and emission. On the other hand, under optimal taxes, two types of taxes affect identically. Under incomplete information carbon taxes seem more efficient than emission taxes. Based on these conclusions, we suggest to launch environmental tax based on emission function. Or the selection of taxes should consider the emission properties in production.

Seawater intrusion poses a serious threat to coastal areas around the world. The purpose of this study was to develop a comprehensive approach to assess the vulnerability of saltwater intrusion. The powerful decision-making technique GALDIT was firstly selected, and its inherent weights are the origin of the subjective method. The entropy method was then integrated to reasonably determine the objective weight of this basic structure. Furthermore, to balance conflicts between subjective and objective methods, game theory was intruded upon. The result of the sensitivity analysis showed a correlation coefficient between the effective weights and theoretical weights of the normal method, entropy theory, and game theory of 0.66, 0.89, and 0.94, respectively. Meanwhile, the best correlation coefficient between the vulnerability indices and the values of 38 monitoring wells was obtained by the game model. Finally, the optimal weights of G, A, L, D, I, and T were 0.096, 0.153, 0.220, 0.320, 0.150, and 0.061, respectively. The study area was finally classified into regions with high, moderate, and low vulnerability, accounting for 11.4%, 24.9%, and 63.7% of the area. The paper included that the optimization of GALDIT through game theory gives a more accurate assessment of the groundwater vulnerability to seawater intrusion.

Nowadays, many countries in the world have paid attention to the issue of improving the eco-compensation program for their forest ecotourism systems aiming to successfully drive forest ecosystem protection. However, an operable eco-compensation mechanism must give a fair and balanced consideration to each involved party’s pursuits which naturally encompass benefits and responsibilities. In this study, based on the evolutionary game theory, we developed a set of mathematical models to evaluate the attitudes and preferences toward the eco-compensation programs in which the three primary stakeholders are involved including farmers, local government, and business groups in order to investigate whether the stakeholders’ asymptotic stabilization strategy can be discovered. In addition, the simulation analysis shows the sensitivity characteristics and evolution process of stakeholders influenced by multiple influencing factors. The results show that the threshold effect of these factors turns out to be an important basis in formulating sustainable development schemes for the eco-compensation program in the forest ecotourism system. Furthermore, the simulation analysis also shows that the initial state of stakeholders affects the rate of convergence to the asymptotic stability. Accordingly, we put forward the three-stage strategy and address policy implications on the operable eco-compensation program development of the forest ecotourism system.