Green entrepreneurship is a special type of entrepreneurship that can achieve sustainable development, which is advocated for by many countries and regions. Accordingly, large-scale green entrepreneurship activities of new ventures are appearing in the emerging green industry around the world. To initially study how to promote the diffusion of eco-innovation in green entrepreneurship activities, the evolutionary game models of new ventures’ eco-innovation and greenwashing behavior affected by market mechanisms and government regulations were respectively established. Furthermore, a benign evolution path of the system was proposed by analyzing the evolutionary stable state of the green entrepreneurial system composed of the government and new ventures. Then, the simulation analysis was carried out using a case study to more intuitively observe the influence of some important parameters including government subsidies and so forth on the evolutionary stable state of the system. The research showed that it is difficult for pure market mechanisms to promote the spread of new ventures’ eco-innovation behaviors in the initial stage of the development of the emerging green industry, and the government regulation is exceedingly important. The parallel use and timely adjustments between the government subsidy and penalty mechanisms can effectively promote the diffusion of new ventures’ eco-innovation behaviors under certain conditions. Besides, the size (positive and negative) of the benefits gaps realized by “greenwashing” and “eco-innovation” radically determines the direction and result of the evolution of new ventures’ behavioral strategies.

To further reduce carbon emissions, supply chain members implement the low-carbon production process and use varieties of contracts to coordinate the channel. Considering the effect of emission reduction, this paper studies a two-echelon supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. Two supply chain members dedicate to maximize profits by reducing their products’ carbon emissions under two different contracts: the wholesale price contract and the consignment contract. The Stackelberg differential game is used, and the optimal strategies of emission reduction effort, wholesale, and retail price in the two situations are studied. The results show that the Pareto improvement for the whole supply chain can be reached under the consignment contract. However, the specific impacts on the retailer and the manufacturer are different. When consumers have a higher level of environmental awareness, the retailer tends to decrease her proportion of sales revenue under the consignment contract. At that time, choosing the wholesale price contract is more favorable for the retailer. However, as the retailer’s proportion of sales revenue becomes lower, the proportion of revenue belonging to the manufacturer will increase. It would be better for the manufacturer to choose the consignment contract.

Seawater intrusion poses a serious threat to coastal areas around the world. The purpose of this study was to develop a comprehensive approach to assess the vulnerability of saltwater intrusion. The powerful decision-making technique GALDIT was firstly selected, and its inherent weights are the origin of the subjective method. The entropy method was then integrated to reasonably determine the objective weight of this basic structure. Furthermore, to balance conflicts between subjective and objective methods, game theory was intruded upon. The result of the sensitivity analysis showed a correlation coefficient between the effective weights and theoretical weights of the normal method, entropy theory, and game theory of 0.66, 0.89, and 0.94, respectively. Meanwhile, the best correlation coefficient between the vulnerability indices and the values of 38 monitoring wells was obtained by the game model. Finally, the optimal weights of G, A, L, D, I, and T were 0.096, 0.153, 0.220, 0.320, 0.150, and 0.061, respectively. The study area was finally classified into regions with high, moderate, and low vulnerability, accounting for 11.4%, 24.9%, and 63.7% of the area. The paper included that the optimization of GALDIT through game theory gives a more accurate assessment of the groundwater vulnerability to seawater intrusion.

Nowadays, many countries in the world have paid attention to the issue of improving the eco-compensation program for their forest ecotourism systems aiming to successfully drive forest ecosystem protection. However, an operable eco-compensation mechanism must give a fair and balanced consideration to each involved party’s pursuits which naturally encompass benefits and responsibilities. In this study, based on the evolutionary game theory, we developed a set of mathematical models to evaluate the attitudes and preferences toward the eco-compensation programs in which the three primary stakeholders are involved including farmers, local government, and business groups in order to investigate whether the stakeholders’ asymptotic stabilization strategy can be discovered. In addition, the simulation analysis shows the sensitivity characteristics and evolution process of stakeholders influenced by multiple influencing factors. The results show that the threshold effect of these factors turns out to be an important basis in formulating sustainable development schemes for the eco-compensation program in the forest ecotourism system. Furthermore, the simulation analysis also shows that the initial state of stakeholders affects the rate of convergence to the asymptotic stability. Accordingly, we put forward the three-stage strategy and address policy implications on the operable eco-compensation program development of the forest ecotourism system.