In the context of nonpoint source pollution the regulator can not attribute individually the responsibility of pollution because of informational asymmetry which makes the costs of monitoring of individual emission very high. This grounds a moral hazard problem. We analyse group performance based instruments to regulate this kind of informational problem. In particular, we assess randomand collective fining schemes with respect to their deterrence and efficiency. We show that a collective fine scheme is more deterrent than a random fine scheme. However, the analysis of efficiency is less categorical between these two schemes. The efficiency depends on the number of non-compliant agents. If the number of non-compliant agents is high it is better to implement a collective fine scheme. If the number of non-compliant agents is small it is better to implement a random fine scheme.

A 2-year open-top chamber experiment with field-grown winter wheat (Triticum aestivum L. cv. Astron) was conducted to examine the effects of ozone on plant growth and selected groups of soil mesofauna in the rhizosphere. From May through June in each year, plants were exposed to two levels of O3: nonfiltered (NF) ambient air or NFþ 40 ppb O3 (NFþ). During O3 exposure, soil sampling was performed at two dates according to different plant growth stages. O3 exposure reduced above- and below-ground plant biomass in the first year, but had little effect in the second year. The individual density of enchytraeids, collembolans and soil mites decreased significantly in the rhizosphere of plants exposed to NF+ in both years. Differences were highest around anthesis, i.e. when plants are physiologically most active. The results suggest that elevated O3 concentrations may influence the dynamic of decomposition processes and the turnover of nutrients.

In this article we treat the problemof nonpoint source pollution as a problem of moral hazard in group. To solve this kind of problemwe consider a group performance based tax coupled to tradable permits market. The tax is activated if the group fails to meet the ambient standard. So the role of the tax is to provide an incitation to ensure that the agents provide the abatement level necessary to achieve the standard. The role of the tradable permits market is to distribute effectively this abatement level through the price of the permits which rises with the exchange of the permits.

Content of arsenic in groundwater form south Banat which are used for water supply of local population was determined. 228 wells were analyzed, and for arsenic determination was used atomic apsorption spectrometry - graphite furnace technique (Perkin Elmer Analyst 700). Arsenic is detected in concentrations over 10 microgram/l in several locations: Pancevo (water supply Filter Stanica, Gradska Suma, OB, and in part of water supply Sibnica), Kovin, Dubovac, Idvor, Veliki Gaj, Glogonj, Sefkerin and part of Sakule. The lowest concentrations of arsenic are detected in the territory of Deliblatska Pescara and municipalities of Vrsac and Bela Crkva.

Anionic clays (layered double hydroxides) comprise positively charged layers with at least two different metal cations, octahedrally coordinated by hydroxyl groups. The positive charges of layered double hydroxides are counterbalanced by interlayer anions. The interlayer anions and water, which fill the interlayer space, are often labile. Therefore, anionic clays exhibit anion exchange capacity (AEC). Anionic clays which have a high surface area and a high anion exchange capacity, are potential adsorbents for anionic contanimants, such as the oxyanion of chrome. The adsorption study of chromium (VI) from aqueous solutions by natural cationic clay mineral (kaolinite, montmorillonite, etc.) was not given much attention, perhaps due to the fact cationic clays have negatively charged layers and clay mineral surface shows no affinity for oxyanion of chrome.