Peasant passivity and violence. Problems of peasant organization during land reform in communist China.
1981
Hazard B.P.
Peasants have frequently been observed to exhibit two patterns of political behavior which tend to inhibit the formation and consolidation of peasant economic and political organizations, namely political passivity and violence. Theories so far have usually concentrated on explaining either only one of these behavior patterns, or only one class context (either inter- or intra-class relations). Noting that Chinese peasants during land reform frequently adopted these behavior patterns both towards landlords and towards peasant leaders of their organizations, the author develops her own explanation based on the analysis of several case studies, one of which is presented here in detail as illustration. Her main hypothesis is that Chinese peasants make rational behavior-choices based not only on the calculation of expected material benefits, but also on that of political risks. This latter calculation appears to rest on certain assumptions which are shared by the majority of Chinese peasants and which do not differ in content when considering the future political behavior of peasant rather than landlord power-wielders.
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