Developing Countries and Enforcement of Trade Agreements : Why Dispute Settlement is Not Enough

Bown, Chad P.; Bernard M., Hoekman

Developing Countries and Enforcement of Trade Agreements : Why Dispute Settlement is Not Enough

2007

Bown, Chad P. | Bernard M., Hoekman

Poor countries are rarely challenged in formal World Trade Organization trade disputes for failing to live up to commitments, reducing the benefits of their participation in international trade agreements. This paper examines the political-economic causes of the failure to challenge poor countries, and discusses the static and dynamic costs and externality implications of this failure. Given the weak incentives to enforce World Trade Organization rules and disciplines against small and poor members, bolstering the transparency function of the World Trade Organization is important for making trade agreements more relevant to trade constituencies in developing countries. Although the paper focuses on the World Trade Organization system, the arguments also apply to reciprocal North-South trade agreements.

Afficher plus [+]

Mots clés AGROVOC

case law consumers developing countries development economics dispute settlement dumping economic development economic implications european union exports free trade income international bank international cooperation international organizations international trade market access market structure overhead costs production costs terms of trade trade agreements trade disputes trade liberalization trade negotiations trade policies trade preferences treaties valuation wages world trade organization wto

Informations bibliographiques

Editeur

World Bank, Washington, DC

D'autres materias

Preferential trade; Developing country market; Investigative procedure; Generalized system of preferences; Imports of textiles; Import tariffs; Tariff bindings; Reciprocity; Income group; Policy research; Preferential trade agreement; Anti-dumping measures; Trading partners; Multilateral surveillance; Safeguard measures; Protectionism; Wto membership; Trade effects; Economics literature; Middle-income economies; Development assistance; Developing economy; Export market; Trade externalities; Economic law; Industrial structure; Core business; Political economy; Trade policy review mechanism; Trade liberalization commitments; Domestic industries; Countervailing duties; Production process; Trade policy; Domestic courts; Small country; National trade remedy laws; Dispute settlement system; Foreign government; Domestic producers; Transition countries; Wto members; Economic costs; Trade rounds; Trade dispute; Portfolio; Trade remedy laws; Incentive structure; Trade agreement; Economic theory; Panel process; Transition economies; Customs; World trading system; Multilateral disciplines; Import markets; Legal assistance; Trade agenda; Reciprocal concessions; Member countries; Reputation; Trade area; Exporting country; Economic performance; Trade interests; Performance data; Wto agreements; Policy priorities; Differential treatment; General agreement on trade in services; Multilateral rules; Dispute resolution; Dispute settlement body; Trade reform; Implementation of commitments; Import restrictions; Competitiveness; Economic welfare; Technical assistance; Import competition; Trading partner; Transparency; Economic efficiency; Low-income economies; Consumer interests; Import penetration; Accession; Foreign exporters; Trade restriction; Trade restrictions; World economy; Wto commitments; Concessions; Antidumping duties; Anti-dumping duties; Regulators; Foreign governments; Low tariffs; Policy change; Outsourcing; Policy changes; Antidumping database; Agricultural tariffs; Agreement on trade; Free riders; Developing country exports; Appellate body; Trade performance; Wto secretariat; Developing country; Round agreement; Policy reforms; Balance of concessions; Externality; Foreign country; Intermediate inputs; Value of trade; Democratic societies; Poor countries; Dispute settlement procedures; Welfare gains; Clothing industry; Positive externality; Developing economies; Domestic reform; Foreign industries; Political reasons; International economic law; Export markets; Tariff reductions; International business; World trade; Dispute settlement rules; Non-tariff barrier; Trade issues; Trips agreement; Domestic industry; Trade remedies; Dispute resolution process; Uruguay round; Externalities; Regionalism; Antidumping measures; Treaty obligations; Ldcs; International trading system; Applied tariff; Adverse effect; Small countries; Multilateral trade; Trade openness; Antidumping; Wto rules; Import protection; Domestic market; Trade reforms; Customs valuation; Dispute settlement process; Foreign competition; Investment treaties

Licence

Policy Research Working Paper; No. 4450http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/World BankCC BY 3.0 Unported

Source

Policy Research Working Paper; No. 4450

Sur AGRIS depuis: 2014-09-15

Format: AGRIS AP

Fournisseur de données

Cette notice bibliographique a été fournie par World Bank

Découvrez la collection de ce fournisseur de données dans AGRIS

Liens

http://hdl.handle.net/10986/7525

Consulter Google Scholar

Si vous remarquez des informations incorrectes dans cette référence bibliographique, veuillez nous contacter à l'adresse [email protected]

FAO AGRIS - Système international des sciences et technologies agricoles

Share

Developing Countries and Enforcement of Trade Agreements : Why Dispute Settlement is Not Enough

2007

Mots clés AGROVOC

Informations bibliographiques