Perceptions on incentives for compliance with regulation. The case of Spanish fishermen in the Atlantic
2015
Garza-Gil, M Dolores | Amigo-Dobaño, Lucy | Surís-Regueiro, Juan C. | Varela-Lafuente, Manuel
Illegal and unreported fishing undermines efforts to preserve marine resources because regulators may not be able to achieve their management objectives. The European Commission and the Spanish government have implemented a regulatory framework to try to deter illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing based on sanctions for those who do not comply. This work analyses the perceptions of Spanish fishermen who fish in the Atlantic, regarding monetary and non-monetary incentives/disincentives. In addition, the participation of various institutions in the process for the development and control of fishing regulations and the possible participation of fishermen and other stakeholders is analyzed. The results show that fishermen give a higher value to sanctioning defaulters than to rewarding compliers. In the decision-making process they also significantly value a greater involvement of the fishermen themselves and of the regional governments. However, fishermen value positively that the monitoring be carried out by public institutions and not by other agents.
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