This U4 briefing paper provides a short overview of corruption and the exploitation of marine resources in Africa. This paper argues that the most effective and realistic way of countering corruption appears to be through strengthening transparency and accountability, and that African civil society has an important role to play in scrutinising fisheries access agreements, tracking court cases and monitoring government budgets.<br /><br />Policy reforms that may reduce incentives and opportunities for corruption in fisheries&rsquo; management are also discussed.&nbsp; These include:<br /> placing corruption on the international agenda is a necessary first step in reforming the governance of fisheries and reducing the opportunities for corrupt activities fisheries departments should be encouraged to publish details of license agreements, including information on payments, taxes and fines at a national level, multi&ndash;stakeholder committees could be employed to oversee licensing decisions, instead of this role being undertaken by a single official or department only. At an international level, African states could benefit from negotiating access agreements with foreign fishing nations collectively, rather than alone African civil society organisations should be scrutinising access agreements, tracking court cases and monitoring government budgets. However, few countries have strong civil society organisations that work on fisheries, and those organisations that do exist tend to lack capacity and training experience from other resource sectors suggests the need for independent audits of government departments because tracking revenue flows and government expenditures can be complex and civil society organisations tend to lack the necessary expertise or credibility reforms relating to greater transparency, accountability and public oversight could be joined together<br />through an equivalent of the&nbsp;Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).

The author received the Fishery Research Award (Fiskeriforskningsprisen) at the University of Tromsø 2009, for this doctoral thesis. <br><br>The papers of the thesis are not available in Munin (mainly) due to publishers' restrictions: <br>1. Nielsen, Kåre Nolde, and Petter Holm: 'The TAC Machine: On the Institutionalization of Sustainable Fisheries Resource Management' (manuscript) <br>2. Nielsen, Kåre Nolde and Petter Holm (2007): 'A brief catalogue of failures: Framing evaluation and learning in fisheries resource management', Marine Policy 31: 669-680 (Elevier - publisher's restrictions). Available at <a href=http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2007.03.014>http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2007.03.014</a> <br>3. Schwach, V., D. Bailly, A.-S. Christensen, A. Delaney, P. Degnbol, W. van Densen, P. Holm, H.A. McLay, K.N. Nielsen, M.A. Pastoors, S.A. Reeves, and D.C. Wilson (2007): 'Policy and knowledge in fisheries management: a policy brief', ICES Journal of Marine Science 64: 798-803 (Oxford University Press - publisher's restrictions). Available at <a href=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/icesjms/fsm020>http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/icesjms/fsm020</a> <br>4. Nielsen, Kåre Nolde: 'Risking Precaution: Framing Uncertainty in Fisheries Advice' (manuscript) <br>5. Hauge, K.H., K.N. Nielsen, and K. Korsbrekke (2007): 'Limits to transparency— exploring conceptual and operational aspects of the ICES framework for providing precautionary fisheries management advice', ICES Journal of Marine Science 64: 738-743 (Oxford University Press - publisher's restrictions). Available at <a href=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/icesjms/fsm058>http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/icesjms/fsm058</a> <br>6. Holm, Petter and Kåre Nielsen (2007): 'Framing fish, making markets: the construction of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs)’, in 'Market Devices' edited by Michel Callon, Yuval Millo and Fabian Muniesa (Blackwell - publisher's restrictions). <a href=http://x-port-sfx.uio.no/sfx_ubto?&isbn=978-1-4051-7028-4%2C+h.&aulast=Callon&title=Market+devices+%2F+edited+by+Michel+Callon%2C+Yuval+Millo+and+Fabian+Muniesa&encoding=65001>Check availability</a> | What is the relationship between science and politics? What should it be? How are their respective roles conceived and acted out in practice? Should science and politics be clearly separated? How? Are there cases in which they can be usefully mixed? What cases are those, and are there some ways of mixing that are better than others? This project explores such questions by examining relationships between ICES fisheries advice and decision-making in fisheries management. While traditional conceptions portray science as a rather autonomous entity, this case examines a context in which such conceptions are particularly prone to be challenged. First, scientific advice that forms direct inputs into policy-making is better characterized as ‘research’ or ‘mode-2 science’ than as autonomous science. Second, advisory science on fisheries management is ‘post-normal’ insofar as its knowledge claims are uncertain, values disputed and decisions urgent. Here, fact and values easily become entangled, which in turn challenges conceptions of autonomous science. How is the science-politics boundary constructed here? <br>Since ICES advice constitutes the formal and highly important link between science and politics in fisheries, it offers a concrete location for studying boundary dynamics. Although this project mainly mobilizes Science and Technology Studies theory (in particular Actor Network Theory) it not only seeks to contribute to this literature, but considers how insights generated from such perspectives may contribute to the ongoing discourses on fisheries science and management. <br>The thesis demonstrates that a comprehensive understanding of the construction, maintenance and transgression of the boundary between fisheries advisory science and management cannot be limited to studies of ‘boundary work’ as discursive practices; it also requires examinations of practices in scientific knowledge production, the material embodiment of this knowledge, its use in policy-making, and conditions on which its stability depends. Forms of uncertainty in ICES fisheries advice are explored and are demonstrated to challenge conceptions of a clear-cut science-politics boundary. The thesis proposes ways in which the science and politics of fisheries can be reconsidered by the development of a framework for enabling evaluations of fisheries management systems. This is expected to enhance communication across disciplines concerned with fisheries management, and to promote systemic learning. | Hva er forholdet mellom politikk og vitenskap? Med et utgangspunkt i Science and Technology Studies teori (primært ANT), undersøker jeg dette forhold i en case, nemlig forholdet mellom det Internasjonale Havforskningsråds (ICES) fiskerirådgivning og fiskeriforvaltning, der forestillingen om en uavhengig vitenskap er særlig utfordret. ICES vitenskap er ‘post normal’ for så vidt at kunnskapsgrunnlaget er usikkert, verdiene diskutable og beslutningene haster – en situasjon der verdier og fakta fort sammenfiltres. <br>Jeg viser at en grundig forståelse av grenselinjene mellom rådgivende fiskeriforskning og politisk forvaltning krever en undersøkelse av vitenskapens metoder, hvordan de former politiske beslutningsprosesser, og hvilke antagelser de bygger på. Forskjellige former for usikkerhet i ICES rådgivning undersøkes og vises at utfordre forestillingen om en klar grense mellom politikk og vitenskap. Avhandlingen inviterer til refleksjon over politikk og vitenskap gjennom utviklingen av et rammeverk, som kan muliggjøre en systematisk evaluering av fiskeriforvaltningssystemer, og stimulere systematisk læring.

This paper tells a story about conditions in Tanzania's hidden economy, the parts of the natural resource sector often ignored in conventional economic analyses and studies, and makes recommendations for future policy actions. The paper draws primarily from extensive background studies undertaken of the forestry, fishery, wildlife, mining, and tourism sub sectors (COWI 2005) as well as a wide range of complementary studies undertaken by the World Bank and others. It de-emphasizes those sectors with factors of production that are not readily traded or exported (such as land and water), although some examples are given relating to soil quality and water management based on extensive studies undertaken within the agriculture and water sectors. The story is relatively simple: pricing distortions, coupled with institutional weakness and the lack of rule of law, have created an environment that undermines economic growth. This paper also acknowledges that Tanzania has already taken positive steps to making some of the needed corrections to protect its natural resources. In recent analyses of corruption indicators world-wide (World Bank Institute 2006), Tanzanian stands out among those nations as having made significant progress towards improving accountability and reducing economic leakages. Anti-corruption legislation was drafted for parliament attention in early 2007. Revisions to the Deep Sea Fishing Authority Act were passed into law in early 2007. Moreover, changes in institutional arrangements, taxation, and general management of the resource sector show promise and have contributed positively to general economic growth. Yet, the sector remains fragile and vulnerable in other respects: perceptions of unequal income distribution, impacts of climate change, and other external influences must also be addressed to build on past successes.

This paper tells a story about conditions in Tanzania's hidden economy, the parts of the natural resource sector often ignored in conventional economic analyses and studies, and makes recommendations for future policy actions. The paper draws primarily from extensive background studies undertaken of the forestry, fishery, wildlife, mining, and tourism sub sectors (COWI 2005) as well as a wide range of complementary studies undertaken by the World Bank and others. It de-emphasizes those sectors with factors of production that are not readily traded or exported (such as land and water), although some examples are given relating to soil quality and water management based on extensive studies undertaken within the agriculture and water sectors. The story is relatively simple: pricing distortions, coupled with institutional weakness and the lack of rule of law, have created an environment that undermines economic growth. This paper also acknowledges that Tanzania has already taken positive steps to making some of the needed corrections to protect its natural resources. In recent analyses of corruption indicators world-wide (World Bank Institute 2006), Tanzanian stands out among those nations as having made significant progress towards improving accountability and reducing economic leakages. Anti-corruption legislation was drafted for parliament attention in early 2007. Revisions to the Deep Sea Fishing Authority Act were passed into law in early 2007. Moreover, changes in institutional arrangements, taxation, and general management of the resource sector show promise and have contributed positively to general economic growth. Yet, the sector remains fragile and vulnerable in other respects: perceptions of unequal income distribution, impacts of climate change, and other external influences must also be addressed to build on past successes.