Competition vs. quality in an industry with imperfect traceability
2011
Rouviere, Elodie | Soubeyran, Raphael
We consider an industry where firms produce goods that have different quality levels but firms cannot differentiate themselves from rivals. In this situation, producing low-quality generates a negative externality on the whole industry. This is particularly true when consumers cannot identify producers. In this article, we show that under a "Laissez Faire" situation free entry is not socially optimal and we argue that the imposition of a Minimum Quality Standard (MQS) may induce firms to enter the market.
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Библиографическая информация
Другие темы
Economies and finances; Economies et finances; Politique de l'entreprise; Biens de consommation
Язык
Английский
Тип
Journal Article
2016-10-15
2025-12-04
AGRIS AP
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