Reputation acquisition in imperfect financial markets
2016
Asano, Koji
This paper incorporates financial market imperfections into the Diamond (1989) model where reputation concerns limit managers’ excessive risk-taking. We show that the reputational discipline collapses because of an increase in pledgeability and a decline in interest rates over time.
Показать больше [+] Меньше [-]Ключевые слова АГРОВОК
Библиографическая информация
Издатель
Elsevier B.V.
Другие темы
Risk-taking; Low interest rates; G01; G11; Pledgeability; Interest (finance); Reputation
Язык
Английский
Тип
Journal Article; Text
2024-02-27
MODS
Поставщик данных
Эту запись предоставил National Agricultural Library
If you notice any incorrect information relating to this record, please contact us at [email protected] [email protected]