Design and coordination for multi-channel recycling of oligopoly under the carbon tax mechanism
2019
Zhan, Xueli | Ma, Junhai | Li, Yaping | Zhu, Liqing
Consider a dual-oligopoly game model of two manufacturers and consumers, where the government collects taxes from manufacturers based on their carbon emissions and the manufacturers can recycle waste products from consumers to reduce production cost and carbon emission taxes. Since manufactures are taking various strategies to achieve carbon abatement, models are also built under different circumstances. After solving the single phase equilibrium solution, a multi-period dynamic game model is further built. The complex characteristics, such as bifurcation, chaos and sensitivity are analyzed through 3-D stable state diagrams, parameter basin diagrams, and bifurcation diagrams. The results show that the system stability range, which is kept by the manufacturer's recovery price and its adjustment speed, reduces with the increase of carbon tax. Compared with manufacturer 1 who sells new products and recycles waste ones at the same time, the manufacturer 2 who only sells but not recycles has slighter influence on carbon emissions, and the sensitivity of consumers to price on the stability of the system is quite lower.
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