Income Heterogeneity and Communication in Global Public Goods
2017
Ruiz-Tagle, J. Cristobal
The stabilization of the world’s climate is a perfect case of a collective action problem that—because the efforts by an individual country have little effect—requires coordination amongcountries in order to attain desirable outcomes. Experimental evidence suggests that one wayof attaining such coordination is by allowing for interaction and negotiation amongheterogeneous agents and/or groups of such agents. In this paper we test experimentally thepotential gains of interaction among heterogeneous agents in the presence of a collectiveaction problem such as climate change negotiations. This research has direct implication foradvising policy makers and country officials at climate negotiations in order to achieve aninternational climate change agreement. Addressing affirmatively this research question shouldadvice officials about the convenience to act together, or in country-blocks, when negotiatinggreen-house gas (GHG) emission reductions for the next international climate changeagreement.
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