Structure and power in multilateral negotiations: an application to french water policy | Structure et pouvoir dans les négociations multi-latérales : une application à la politique de l'eau en France
2007
Simon, L. | Goodhue, R.E. | Rausser, G.C. | Thoyer, S. | Morardet, Sylvie | Rio, P. | University of California [Berkeley] (UC Berkeley) ; University of California (UC) | Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro) | Gestion de l'Eau, Acteurs, Usages (UMR G-EAU) ; Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement (Cirad)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-AgroParisTech-Centre national du machinisme agricole, du génie rural, des eaux et forêts (CEMAGREF)-Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD [France-Sud])-Centre International de Hautes Etudes Agronomiques Méditerranéennes - Institut Agronomique Méditerranéen de Montpellier (CIHEAM-IAMM) ; Centre International de Hautes Études Agronomiques Méditerranéennes (CIHEAM)-Centre International de Hautes Études Agronomiques Méditerranéennes (CIHEAM) | International Water Management Institute [CGIAR, Afrique du Sud] (IWMI) ; International Water Management Institute [CGIAR, Sri Lanka] (IWMI) ; Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research [CGIAR] (CGIAR)-Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research [CGIAR] (CGIAR) | Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (LAMETA) ; Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UPVM)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro)
[Departement_IRSTEA]RE [TR1_IRSTEA]GES / USAGES
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显示更多 [+] 显示较少 [-]英语. Environmental policies are characterized by a growing emphasis on participation, devolution and negotiated decision making. There is therefore a rising demand for applied simulation models which can be used as 'negotiation-support tools' to analyse the impact of the negotiation structure on the negotiated outcome. In this paper, we apply a computable non cooperative bargaining model designed to study complex real world multi-agent, multi-issue negotiation problems, to a specific negotiation process, involving water use and storage capacity. The application is on the upper part of the Adour Basin in south-western France. The case study is modelled with seven aggregate players (three aggregate farmers representing three sub-basins - upstream, midstream and downstream - two environmental lobbies, the taxpayer and the water manager), and with up to nine negotiated variables (water quotas and water prices in each sub-basin, and the capacities of three dams). Comparative statics experiments highlight a number of aspects of the relationship between negotiation structure and bargaining power.
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