Efficient information acquisition with heterogeneous agents
2021
Femminis, Gianluca | Piccirilli, Giulio
In a Gaussian-quadratic economy with dispersed information, we correct the inefficiency in information acquisition by making the tax rate on agents own actions contingent on actions themselves. This aligns individual and social evaluations of information quality. Our policy is robust to considering heterogeneous unobservable costs in information acquisition, since agents share a common evaluation of the benefit of information quality.
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书目信息
出版者
Kluwer/Plenum Publishers [etc.]
其它主题
D62; D82; C72; H21; Information acquisition; Heterogeneous agents
语言
英语
类型
Journal Article; Text
2024-02-27
MODS