Does monitoring deter future cheating? The case of external examiners in Italian schools
2021
We use the repeated random assignment of external examiners to schools in Italy to investigate whether the effect of external monitoring on test score manipulation persists over time. We find that this effect is still present in the tests taken one year after exposure to the examiners. In the second year after exposure, however, this effect disappears, suggesting that persistence is short lived.
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书目信息
Economics letters
卷
201
页码
109742
ISSN
0165-1765
出版者
American Chemical Society
其它主题
Short-run effects; H52; External monitoring; I2
语言
英语
类型
Journal Article; Text
2024-02-28
MODS