Equilibrium in the symmetric two-player Hirshleifer contest: Uniqueness and characterization
2018
Ewerhart, Christian | Sun, Guang-Zhen
The symmetric two-player Hirshleifer contest admits a unique equilibrium. The equilibrium support is finite and includes the zero expenditure level. We also establish a lower bound for the cardinality of the support and an upper bound for the undissipated rent.
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书目信息
Economics letters
卷
169
页码
51
- 54
ISSN
0165-1765
出版者
Elsevier B.V.
其它主题
C72; Uniqueness; Contests; Rent dissipation; D72; D74; Mixed-strategy equilibrium
语言
英语
类型
Journal Article; Text
2024-02-28
MODS