A model of Bayesian persuasion with transfers
2017
Li, Cheng
We analyze a persuasion game in which a sender wants to persuade a receiver to take an action. The sender first produces information about the benefits of taking the action and then offers monetary transfers to the receiver. We characterize a sender-optimal information structure and show that limiting monetary payments may incentivize the sender to produce more information.
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书目信息
Economics letters
卷
161
页码
93
- 95
ISSN
0165-1765
出版者
Elsevier B.V.
其它主题
Persuasion; Monetary transfers; Signal informativeness; D83; Bayesian persuasion
语言
英语
类型
Text; Journal Article
2024-02-28
MODS
