Implementation of environmental regulation strategies for nitrogen pollution in river basins: a stakeholder game perspective
2022
Xi, Xuan | Zhang, Yulin
With the rapid development of modern agriculture, non-point source nitrogen pollution from higher polluting farms has become one of the main contributions to the eutrophication of the watershed. This paper first constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model concerning local governments, higher polluting farms, and consumers, all of which participate in the reduction of nitrogen pollution in the river basin. Secondly, the evolution process of evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) and the impact of critical parameters on the strategies of the three stakeholders were analyzed through numerical simulation. The results demonstrated that (1) six ESSs of the system are determined, only (1, 0, 1) is regarded as the most ideal ESS: regulation by local governments, higher polluting farms adopting not purchasing emission rights, and consumers purchasing green agricultural products. (2) The regulation strategy of local governments depends on comparing political losses with the sum of emission reduction subsidies and the supervision cost. (3) The marginal abatement costs, the price of nitrogen emission permits, nitrogen use efficiency, and the subsidy standard for unit emission reduction are the main factors that affect the ESS of higher polluting farms. (4) The ESS of consumers is significantly affected by low-nitrogen preference, government subsidies, and nitrogen use efficiency. This study suggests that the government should strengthen the supervision of the watershed environment from the aspects of improving the market mechanism of nitrogen trading, establishing a dynamic monitoring system, and innovating a subsidy mechanism.
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