This study characterizes the use of risk monitoring mechanisms by coffee and soybean trading and processing companies. It also investigates the role these mechanisms play in the mitigation of certain transaction costs associated to bounded rationality, information asymmetry, and business opportunism in negotiations involving derivatives. The results presented are based on literature and original research, which consisted of interviews with 19 coffee and soybean trading and processing company agents that deal with the management and execution of derivatives trades. The interviews suggest that the interest in formal risk monitoring mechanisms depends strongly on the organizational structure of the business. In family businesses, in which the owner participates actively in negotiations, the interest is limited. In non-family businesses, where there is a clear separation between supervisory upper-management and agents involved with trading, the interest in risk monitoring systems is more evident. This result seems to indicate that the mitigation of transaction costs associated with information asymmetry and opportunism might be stronger motivations for interest in risk monitoring mechanisms than the costs resulting from bounded rationality.

This work evaluates the economic efficiency of productive resource utilization in the cultivation of soybeans in the state of Mato Grosso do Sul, Brazil. The study area comprises the states main soybean producing counties. Economic efficiency was estimated for a sample of 151 soybean producers through the production frontier function. The producers in the states northern region are operating near the established production frontier, signaling a favorable tendency in resource reallocation and achieving efficiency.

The main objective of this study was to identify and analyze the sources of inefficiency in family operated small agricultural properties in the Brazilian state of Bahias Recôncavo region from a sample of 44 producers. A non-parametric approach, in the context of cost minimizing behavior under constant returns to scale, was used to estimate the indices of technical, scale, allocative, and total (economic or cost) efficiency. Results indicated that the largest source small family farm inefficiency in the Recôncavo region is allocative inefficiency, that is to say, the non-observance of price relationships when making production decisions. On the average, 79.1% of these farms total inefficiency is due to allocative inefficiency, 9.3% to technical inefficiency, and 11.7% to scale inefficiency.

This article analyzes the effectiveness of hedging Brazilian soy oil, soy meal, and soybeans in the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) and in the Brazilian Commodities and Futures Exchange (BM&F) to reduce the risk of financial loss due to commodity price fluctuations. The econometric results show that a cross-hedging strategy using the BM&F soybean futures contract is an instrument of low effectiveness for managing soy oil and soy meal price risk. Despite low effectiveness, the estimates demonstrate total advantage for soy meal hedging operations using CBOT soy meal futures contracts rather than cross-hedging using BM&F soybean futures contracts. With some exceptions, the results are also more favorable for hedging soy oil with soy oil futures contracts at the CBOT rather than cross hedging with soybeans at the BM&F. Conversely, Brazilian traders hedging soybeans receive more effective risk protection by trading soybean futures contracts at the BM&F than by trading soybean futures contracts at the CBOT.