Financing Agreement, C4456-ET Conformed
Pavluk,Jonathan David
In studies of decentralized governance in the developing world, electoral institutions have largely been overlooked as explanatory factors for the performance of local governments. Instead, much of the current research on accountability and performance in local governments has focused on macro-social factors as determinants of accountability in local governments. This paper does not discount the importance of these macro-social variables, but it proposes an institutional focus on local government success, examining the role of local electoral arrangements on accountability. The paper argues that even if electoral institutions cannot compensate for social forces that are hostile to the exercise of downward accountability; given favorable social conditions, certain electoral arrangements will likely improve accountability and provision of public goods in local communities. Through evaluating results from Latin America, Africa, and Asia, the paper argues that the mixed findings surrounding the relationship between degree of electoral competition and public goods provision in local governments illustrates the secondary importance of electoral institutions. The paper identifies rules surrounding partisanship in elections, nomination rules, term-limits, and recall provisions as key variables likely to influence accountability and performance in local governments. The paper also examines local electoral systems (proportional representation vs. first-past-the-post systems), the degree of competition in local elections, and rules surrounding affirmative action in local elections.
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