Heterogeneity in a class of two-player games
2011
Figuieres , Charles (INRA , Montpellier (France). UMR 1135 Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée) | Rychen , Frédéric (Université Aix-Marseille 2, Marseille(France). GREQAM. Groupement de Recherche en Economie Quantitative d'Aix Marseille)
In two-player games with negative (positive) spillovers it is well-known that symmetric agents both overact (underact) at the Nash equilibria. We show that for heterogeneous agents this rule of thumb has to be amended if the game features strategic substitutability.
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