Multidimensional auctions for long-term procurement contracts under the threat of early exit
2015
Di Corato, Luca | Dosi, Cesare | Moretto, Michele
In this paper we study how early-exit options, embedded in long-term procurement contracts which do not provide for sufficiently strong incentives against contract breach, can affect bidding behaviors in multidimensional procurement auctions and the parties' expected payoffs. We show first that bidders' payoff is lower when competing for contracts with unenforceable contract terms. Secondly, that neglecting the risk of opportunistic behavior by sellers can lead to contract awards that do not maximize the buyer's potential payoff. Finally, we make suggestions about how to mitigate potential misallocations, by pointing out the role of eligibility rules and competition among bidders.
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