Groundwater depletion in India is a result of water, energy, and food policies that have given rise to a nexus where growth in agriculture has been supported by unsustainable trends in water and energy use. This nexus emanates from India’s policy of providing affordable calories to its large population. This requires that input prices are kept low, leading to perverse incentives that encourage groundwater overexploitation. The paper argues that solutions to India’s groundwater problems need to be embedded within the current context of its water-energy-food nexus. Examples are provided of changes underway in some water-energy-food policies that may halt further groundwater depletion.

Using water-energy-food-environment (WEFE) nexus as the prism, this review explores evolution of groundwater governance in Iran, Saudi Arabia, Mexico, China, Bangladesh and India – which together account for two-thirds of the global groundwater-irrigated area. Global discourse has blamed widespread water scarcity squarely on supply-side policymaking and advocated a broader template of water governance instruments. Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) presented just such a template – with pricing, participation, rights and entitlements, laws, regulations, and river basin organizations – as additional water governance tools. However, the IWRM template faced disillusionment and pushback in many emerging economies. WEFE nexus, the new paradigm, prioritizes system-level optima over sectoral maxima by harnessing synergies and optimizing trade-offs between food, water, energy, soil, and eco-system sustainability within planetary boundaries. Realizing this vision presents a complex challenge in groundwater governance. Global groundwater economy comprises three sub-economies: (a) diesel-powered unregulated, as in Nepal terai, eastern India, Bangladesh, Pakistan Punjab and Sind, and much of Sub-Saharan Africa, where use-specific energy subsidies are impractical; (b) electricity-powered regulated, as in North America and Europe, where tubewells are authorized, metered and subject to consumption-linked energy charges; and (c) electricity-powered unregulated, as in geographies covered by our review – barring China, Bengal and Bangladesh – where unmeasured electricity subsidies have created a bloated groundwater economy. This last sub-economy represents the heartland of global groundwater malgovernance, least equipped to meet the sustainability challenge. It has an estimated 300 million horsepower of grid-connected electric pumps that are either unauthorized and/or unmetered and/or use free or heavily subsidized or pilfered power for irrigating 50–52 million hectares, nearly half of global groundwater-irrigated area. In (a) and (b), groundwater scarcity inspires water-energy saving behavior via increased energy cost of pumping. In sub-economy (c), users are immune to energy costs and impervious to groundwater depletion. Here, the WEFE nexus has remained blind to the irrigation realpolitik that catalyzes or constrains policy action. We explore why the political costs of rationalizing subsidies are prohibitive and exemplify how a smart transition from fossil to solar energy for pumping may offer an opportunity to turn the perverse WEFE nexus into a virtuous one.

Food, energy, and water (FEW) are interconnected pillars that underpin the security of people’s livelihoods. In this paper, we propose a decision-support model to better understand and aid management of regional FEW nexus systems under uncertainty. We apply the model to a case study focusing on fluctuations in water supply, which significantly affect production in the agriculture and energy sectors in Shanxi Province, China. We use a two-stage, stochastic, chance-constrained programming approach to the proposed spatially detailed cost-minimizing FEW nexus model under demand and natural resource (land and water) constraints. This approach translates the target reliability level (i.e., the probability that the devised solution can satisfy all constraints) into a penalty that has to be paid in the case of their non-fulfillment. On this basis, robust decisions (i.e., production options suitable for a broad variation in certainty of water supply) are derived. Using this approach, we estimate the penalties required to achieve given levels of reliability by incentivizing the deployment of water-saving technologies. For example, our model predicts that water storage would become cost-effective if the penalty for exceeding the available water supply were 2.5 times higher than the current price for industrial water; this would enable at least 40% reliability compared to 18% if the penalty were at the current water price level. Taking advantage of the differences in water intensity of crops in different sites, our model optimizes the reservoir location, which allows water withdrawal by agriculture to be reduced by 1.23%. We also evaluate the benefits of incorporating uncertainty and missed opportunity due to a lack of perfect information. In the case study, we show that the benefits of including uncertainty in the form of the two-stage stochastic programming approach appear to be quite significant, reaching 4% of the total solution costs. Water-importing costs, taxes, and subsidies are instruments that translate into the penalty in this model; the modeling approach presented here can thus be used to inform cost-effective and robust management of the FEW nexus in Shanxi Province, China, and other water-scarce regions around the world.

In India, the nexus between water, food and energy has reached a tipping point. The country can no longer underestimate the crises or delay addressing the issues emanating from the nexus, which already constrain sustainable economic growth in many regions. This paper assesses the trends and turning points of groundwater irrigation, agricultural production and energy consumption in the state of Andhra Pradesh (AP), India, which exemplifies the dire situation that prevails elsewhere in the country. It also shows that the state can reduce agricultural electricity consumption and still achieve a Pareto optimal solution for all stakeholders: farmers, utility companies, the government and, most importantly, the environment. AP has an important place in economic, agricultural land- and water-scape in India. In 2011, the total population of India was 1.2 billion, of which AP accounted for 84 million people. Among the 32 major states in India, AP has the fifth largest population, fourth largest geographical area, second largest economy and 5 million hectares of net irrigated area (NIA), which is 9% of the total NIA of the country. The state has 23 administrative districts in three agro-climatic zones: Telangana, Rayalaseema and Coastal Andhra. Three distinct growth periods depict groundwater irrigation development during the last four decades. Dug wells, along with canals, were the main sources of irrigated area expansion in the 1970s and 1980s. A decline in the number of dug wells and the rapidly increasing number of tube wells were the main features of irrigation development trends in the 1990s. Post-2000 trends show a significant slowdown in the expansion of even the tube well irrigated area. Yet, groundwater depletion is an issue in many regions. Groundwater contributes to 69%, 67% and 23% of NIA in the Telangana, Rayalaseema and Coastal Andhra regions, respectively, and to 48% of the net sown area in AP. In some regions, the consumptive water use (CWU) (evapotranspiration) of crop production alone is a significant part of natural groundwater recharge. With depletion from other sectors, groundwater CWU in many locations are at or above the thresholds of natural groundwater recharge. Electricity consumption increased rapidly with groundwater use. The share of electric pumps in the state increased from 64% to 94% between 1991 and 2008. As a result, agricultural electricity consumption increased by 138% between 1991 and 2008, compared to a 57% growth in NIA using groundwater. Electricity supply is free to farmers, but a high cost has to be borne by the governments. Utility companies estimate the cost of agricultural electricity supply at a flat rate of about USD 0.08/kWh. The government transfers the estimated subsidy to the utility companies to mitigate their losses. The estimated farm power subsidy at the national level is more than USD 6 billion, which is more than the expenditure for health and education in some states. Econometric analyses of district-level data between 1999 and 2008 show that, every 1% growth in groundwater CWU has contributed to a 0.82% increase in agricultural electricity consumption and only a 0.12% gross value of crop output. Thus, a 1% reduction in agricultural electricity consumption will reduce 1.14% of groundwater CWU and will, in turn, reduce 0.14% of the gross value of output. At present, the marginal loss of gross value of output due to a reduction in electricity consumption is far less than the increase in subsidy for that amount of electricity consumed. In many districts, due to high production costs, marginal profits are much less than the subsidy that the government has to payout. Thus, the direct transfer of the electricity subsidy to farmers for reducing electricity consumption is a financially attractive option, rather than the value generated in agricultural production at present. Such a solution can generate even higher environmental and socioeconomic benefits to all stakeholders. It will maintain, at least, the present level of benefits to farmers - the most important stakeholder in the nexus. Power utility companies can reduce losses by selling power to other sectors at a higher incremental rate. The state government can reduce the agricultural power subsidy. Domestic and industrial sectors can increase their productivity and output, for which inadequate power supply is a severe constraint at present. The environment will benefit by reduced groundwater depletion, which contributes to the drying of wetlands and streams, and water quality issues, at present. It is an incentive for farmers to increase efficiency of groundwater use and diversify cropping patterns to high-value low water-intensive crops. The utility companies will have to reduce losses in power transmission and distribution, which, at present, is conveniently included in the subsidy estimation

In India, the nexus between water, food and energy has reached a tipping point. The country can no longer underestimate the crises or delay addressing the issues emanating from the nexus, which already constrain sustainable economic growth in many regions. This paper assesses the trends and turning points of groundwater irrigation, agricultural production and energy consumption in the state of Andhra Pradesh (AP), India, which exemplifies the dire situation that prevails elsewhere in the country. It also shows that the state can reduce agricultural electricity consumption and still achieve a Pareto optimal solution for all stakeholders: farmers, utility companies, the government and, most importantly, the environment. AP has an important place in economic, agricultural land- and water-scape in India. In 2011, the total population of India was 1.2 billion, of which AP accounted for 84 million people. Among the 32 major states in India, AP has the fifth largest population, fourth largest geographical area, second largest economy and 5 million hectares of net irrigated area (NIA), which is 9% of the total NIA of the country. The state has 23 administrative districts in three agro-climatic zones: Telangana, Rayalaseema and Coastal Andhra. Three distinct growth periods depict groundwater irrigation development during the last four decades. Dug wells, along with canals, were the main sources of irrigated area expansion in the 1970s and 1980s. A decline in the number of dug wells and the rapidly increasing number of tube wells were the main features of irrigation development trends in the 1990s. Post-2000 trends show a significant slowdown in the expansion of even the tube well irrigated area. Yet, groundwater depletion is an issue in many regions. Groundwater contributes to 69%, 67% and 23% of NIA in the Telangana, Rayalaseema and Coastal Andhra regions, respectively, and to 48% of the net sown area in AP. In some regions, the consumptive water use (CWU) (evapotranspiration) of crop production alone is a significant part of natural groundwater recharge. With depletion from other sectors, groundwater CWU in many locations are at or above the thresholds of natural groundwater recharge. Electricity consumption increased rapidly with groundwater use. The share of electric pumps in the state increased from 64% to 94% between 1991 and 2008. As a result, agricultural electricity consumption increased by 138% between 1991 and 2008, compared to a 57% growth in NIA using groundwater. Electricity supply is free to farmers, but a high cost has to be borne by the governments. Utility companies estimate the cost of agricultural electricity supply at a flat rate of about USD 0.08/kWh. The government transfers the estimated subsidy to the utility companies to mitigate their losses. The estimated farm power subsidy at the national level is more than USD 6 billion, which is more than the expenditure for health and education in some states. Econometric analyses of district-level data between 1999 and 2008 show that, every 1% growth in groundwater CWU has contributed to a 0.82% increase in agricultural electricity consumption and only a 0.12% gross value of crop output. Thus, a 1% reduction in agricultural electricity consumption will reduce 1.14% of groundwater CWU and will, in turn, reduce 0.14% of the gross value of output. At present, the marginal loss of gross value of output due to a reduction in electricity consumption is far less than the increase in subsidy for that amount of electricity consumed. In many districts, due to high production costs, marginal profits are much less than the subsidy that the government has to payout. Thus, the direct transfer of the electricity subsidy to farmers for reducing electricity consumption is a financially attractive option, rather than the value generated in agricultural production at present. Such a solution can generate even higher environmental and socioeconomic benefits to all stakeholders. It will maintain, at least, the present level of benefits to farmers - the most important stakeholder in the nexus. Power utility companies can reduce losses by selling power to other sectors at a higher incremental rate. The state government can reduce the agricultural power subsidy. Domestic and industrial sectors can increase their productivity and output, for which inadequate power supply is a severe constraint at present. The environment will benefit by reduced groundwater depletion, which contributes to the drying of wetlands and streams, and water quality issues, at present. It is an incentive for farmers to increase efficiency of groundwater use and diversify cropping patterns to high-value low water-intensive crops. The utility companies will have to reduce losses in power transmission and distribution, which, at present, is conveniently included in the subsidy estimation