On sufficiency of dominant strategy implementation in environments with correlated types
2015
Kushnir, Alexey
We show that for any mechanism there exists an equivalent dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism for social choice environments with correlated types when agent’s matrix of conditional probabilities satisfies the full rank condition.
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Библиографическая информация
Economics letters
Том
133
Нумерация страниц
4
- 6
ISSN
0165-1765
Издатель
Elsevier B.V.
Другие темы
Surplus extraction; Dominant strategy implementation; D82; Mechanism design
Язык
Английский
Тип
Journal Article; Text
2024-02-29
MODS
Поставщик данных
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